T
here is a fundamental tension in American politics between the desire to ensure political equality and the belief that the intensity of individual interests should somehow matter in the political process. To make the compromises and tradeoffs essential to the functioning of a political system, we need information about both the direction and intensity of the public will. Direct political participation facilitates fairly well the transmission of intense preferences and perspectives to political elites. If citizens care enough about a particular issue, they may convey their particular wants, needs, and desires to the government in a variety of ways. They may, for example, contact political officials, attend political meetings, or become involved in campaigns. Participation, however, addresses only one of these concerns. Direct participation may represent adequately some intense interests, but it does a poor job of guaranteeing political equality. Political activists, after all, do not come to the political world by chance. Instead, they are drawn disproportionately from those groups more advantaged in the resources that aid participation-such as education and disposable income. Activists therefore differ in politically consequential ways from those who do not participate in politics. As Verba, Schlozman, and Brady conclude, "the voice of the people as expressed through participation comes from a limited and unrepresentative set of citizens" (1995, 2) . The guarantee of free political expression, in other words, does not ensure the equal expression of the political wants, needs, and desires of all members of the public.
But where traditional forms of participation fail, opinion polls may succeed. Although polls may have several shortcomings, they do seem to guarantee that a full spectrum of political interests will be heard in the political system. Polls, if executed correctly, are conducted through random sampling: every individual has an equal chance of being selected and heard in a poll, regardless of her personal circumstance. Polls hold special appeal as a form of gauging the public's will because they appear to be free of the compositional bias that plagues traditional forms of participation.
This conception of opinion polls as "broadly representative" of public sentiment has long pervaded academic and popular discussions of polls (see, for example, Gallup and Rae 1940) . More recently, Verba has argued, "sample surveys provide the closest approximation to an unbiased representation of the public because participation in a survey requires no resources and because surveys eliminate the bias inherent in the fact that participants in politics are self-selected … surveys produce just what democracy is supposed to produce-equal representation of all citizens" (1996, 3) . Thus, while surveys may be limited in several respects they appear to provide a requisite egalitarian complement to traditional forms of political participation. Through opinion polls, the voice of "the people," writ broadly, may be heard.
Or maybe not. In this article, I reconsider this conventional wisdom. Specifically, I demonstrate that both inequalities in politically relevant resources and the larger political culture surrounding social welfare policy issues disadvantage those groups who are natural supporters of the welfare state, even in opinion polls. These supporters-the economically disadvantaged and those who support principles of political equality-are less easily able to form coherent and consistent opinions on such policies than those well endowed with politically relevant resources. Those predisposed to champion the maintenance and expansion of welfare state programs are, as a result, less likely to articulate opinions on surveys. Thus, public opinion on social welfare policy controversies gives disproportionate weight to respondents opposed to expanding the government's role in the economy. This "exclusion bias"-a phenomenon to this point largely ignored in the political science literatureis a source of bias in public opinion. To use the language of Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, the "voice" of those who abstain from the social welfare policy questions is different from those who respond to such items. This result mirrors the patterns of inequality found in traditional forms of political participation. Opinion polls may therefore be plagued by the same inegalitarian shortcomings as traditional forms of political participation.
Getting to Know The "Don't Knows"
Conventional theories of public opinion have treated the survey response as the product of individuals' attempts to reveal their fixed preferences on a given policy issue. Recently, however, a more fluid view of the survey response has emerged, based in part on theories of preference construction developed in cognitive psychology. This view, advanced most forcibly by Zaller and Feldman (Zaller and Feldman 1992) , argues that "individuals do not typically possess 'true attitudes' on issues, as conventional theorizing assumes, but a series of partially independent and often inconsistent ones" (Zaller 1992, 93) . According to this "new look" in public opinion research, a survey response is not necessarily a revealed preference. Attitudes are not fixed objects, evaluations pulled from a mental "file drawer." Instead, they are constructed judgments.
This model of the survey response has important implications for how we view respondents who fail to answer particular questions on a survey. If attitudes are fluid constructions-temporally changing and subject to contextual cues-then the line between answering a question and abstaining from a question should be fluid as well. From this perspective, an individual might arrive at a "don't know" answer when trying to form an opinion because they cannot draw upon a coherent base of politically relevant considerations at the time of the interview. Such a response does not necessarily indicate that the respondent does not possess politically relevant wants, needs, and desires. Instead, the respondent may simply have poorly developed connections between these underlying factors and the political controversy addressed in the survey question. A "don't know" response does not therefore indicate the lack of articulated political concerns or political thought, but rather the lack of political thought structured enough to form a summary evaluation in response to the survey question. Given additional time to explore the matter, respondents may be able to draw on many politically relevant considerations. For example, in-depth open-ended interviews on the subjects of rights and liberties (Chong 1993) and social welfare policy (Hochschild 1981) reveal that, given the opportunity, most individuals will expound at length about a given political controversy. A similar conclusion is suggested by Kinder and Nelson's framing experiments with closedended survey questions (Kinder and Nelson 1998) . There, reminding people about relevant considerations through question wording frames enables some individuals to fill in their mental representations and find their political voice, thereby decreasing the incidence of "don't know" response. 1 What is important for the present purposes is that some individuals might find it difficult to answer closedended survey questions, even if they have politically relevant wants, needs, and desires and engage in-albeit loosely structured-political thought. Simply because respondents are unable to translate their thoughts and feelings into a summary judgment does not mean that those concerns should be irrelevant to those who are interested in how the mass public regards the goings-on of the political world.
This view of the "don't know" response has important implications for the egalitarian properties of opinion polls. When individuals fail to answer survey questions they, in effect, silence their political voices. If "don't knows" are random-if there is no rhyme or reason to the decision to abstain from survey questions-the traditional view of polling advanced by Gallup and Verba is correct. But if there is a systematic process to the decision to offer a "don't know" response, and if the same factors determine both the direction of opinion and the ability to give an opinion, particular interests will be excluded from collective opinion.
The degree of compositional bias in public opinion-what I call exclusion bias-is directly related to the strength of the link between opinion position taking and opinion giving. If the two processes are independent, there should be no systematic relationship between opinion holding and opinion direction. That is, those respondents who are able to express an opinion on a given controversy are no more likely to favor one side of a controversy as they are to favor the other. Under these circumstances, there is no "exclusion" of any particular opinions; nonrespondents are as likely to be of one stripe than another. On the other hand, if the determinants of opinion position and opinion giving overlap significantly, the potential for bias is great because those individuals who would tend to cluster toward one end of the opinion scale will be pressed toward a "don't know" response and, ultimately, removed from public opinion. Put simply, if the same factors that predispose a respondent to offer an answer also push them to one end of the response scale, public opinion will suffer from the truncation of those individuals who would be otherwise predisposed to give survey answers at that end of the scale. 2
Social Welfare Policy and Public Opinion in America
The discussion in the previous section indicates that we should pay especially close attention to those issues where the structural factors that lead to ambivalence, confusion, and, ultimately, reticence in forming opinions are the same factors that lead to particular types of opinions. One area where the presence of such effects seems especially likely is the realm of social welfare policy.
Since the Great Depression, the American welfare state has grown tremendously. While the legitimacy of government involvement in the economy has not been seriously challenged for more than half a century, setting the proper scope of the public support net provided by government has proven to be extremely controversial. Compared other industrialized democracies, support for demands, it might be easier for respondents to engage in satisficing behavior (Krosnick 1991) and move on to the next question if they have difficulty readily forming a political judgment. Thus, some respondents may offer a "don't know" response because they do not feel they have sufficiently strong views to meet the demands of the question being asked. This behavior may be exacerbated by the structure of the information conveyed from the interviewer to the respondent. The use of a "quasi-filter"-where a "don't know" option is presented explicitly-may serve as an implicit (if unintentional) signal that the question-answering task ahead of them is especially difficult. As Schwarz notes, full and quasi-filters imply that the forthcoming questions will ask "for a careful assessment of the issue, based on considerable knowledge of the facts" (1996, 59 ). Thus, the very process of asking the survey question may encourage satisficing behavior. But again, simply because people may suffice when they answer a survey question with a "no opinion" filter does not mean they have nothing to say about the question. Hippler and Schwarz (1989) , for example, find that those respondents who decline to answer the strongly filtered questions are willing to provide substantive responses at a global level of evaluation. In such cases, the decision to give a "don't know" response may be more a function of the specific survey instrument than of the particular political predispositions of the respondent. 2 The argument made here is congruent with those made by scholars critical of the aggregationist tradition (see, for example, Althaus 1998; Bartels 1996) . Some authors, such as Page and Shapiro (1992) , argue that while the answers that individuals give to opinion surveys many be somewhat fluid and changing, public opinion in the aggregate can serve as a reliable and rational gauge of the preferences of the mass public. The views expressed by Page and Shapiro may be true in some cases, but the "purity through aggregation" approach gives a false sense of confidence in aggregate measures. Though individuals may approach the survey interview in different ways, groups of individuals may experience that interview in similar ways. To the extent that differences between groups of individuals systematically affect the answers they give to survey questions, the aggregate signals measured in public opinion surveys may paint a distorted picture of underlying collective public sentiment. The reason is simple. As Bartels notes, "if sources of error affect the entire electorate (or a significant fraction of the entire electorate) in similar ways, the resulting errors will simply not cancel out, no matter how large the electorate may be" (Bartels 1996, 199-200) . The argument presented above adds to the severity of the critique presented by these authors by directly considering the implications of "don't know" responses. Specifically, differential nonresponse is an additional source of aggregate bias, distinct from the "false consciousness" considered by Bartels and Althaus. social welfare programs in the United States is thin and ephemeral.
McClosky and Zaller (1984) suggest that one reason for the controversial nature of the welfare state in the United States is what they term the "American Ethos." Americans, they argue, hold deeply two sets of inherently contradictory values, namely democracy and capitalism. Previous empirical work has born out McClosky and Zaller's predictions about the role played by the conflicting values of democracy and capitalism in determining social welfare policy opinion. Feldman and Zaller (1992) find that individuals draw on both the principles of capitalism (opposition to "big government" and support for individualism) and the principles of democracy (fairness and equalitarianism) when asked "what kinds of things come to mind" in answering social welfare policy questions.
The effect of the value conflict on the types of opinions people form on social welfare policy is not, however, constant across the population. Both liberals and conservatives must deal with the inherent tensions in the American political culture. 3 But, as Feldman and Zaller note, ambivalence and inconsistency in the areas of social welfare policy are not found with equal frequency in all segments of the population. Social welfare conservatives, they find, exhibit less value conflict than liberals. Liberals, they argue, must reconcile their humanitarian democratic impulses with the capitalist impulses towards individualism and limited government. Thus, liberals must balance two equally important, but contrary, values when evaluating social welfare policy programs. As Tetlock's (1986) value pluralism model of ideological reasoning demonstrates, such conflict in deeply held values will lead individuals to be less certain of their political judgments. Conservatives, on the other hand, are able to oppose social welfare policies while at the same time endorsing equality of opportunity rather than the economic equality of results. In this way, social welfare policy conservatives are able to appeal to a single value and need not necessarily suffer from the same value conflict as their liberal opponents.
It is not simply the larger political culture that disadvantages social welfare policy supporters. Those individuals who are victims of resource inequalities-those who do not share fully in society's benefits-are the natural supporters of the welfare state. But these resources, such as education and the income and free time that enable individuals to become informed about politics, are especially important in enabling individuals to resolve value conflict-and, at a more basic level, uncertainty-to form coherent political opinions.
Thus, those individuals who, by dint of their personal characteristics, would support social welfare policies are doubly disadvantaged: they are more prone to the value conflict that leads to difficulty at the stage of opinion formation, and they are lacking in those resources that would allow them to resolve their uncertainty and form political opinions well connected to their personal wants, needs, and desires. 4 Because of these circumstances, social welfare policy seems to fit the criteria for an issue area where significant exclusion bias in public opinion would exist. Liberals are more prone than conservatives to opinion distortions arising from confusion, ambivalence, and uncertainty at the stage of opinion formation. As a result, liberals will be less likely to answer the social welfare policy questions. Public opinion should, therefore, suffer from the truncation of liberal social welfare policy opinion and reflect a conservative compositional bias.
Data and Model Construction
I use the 1996 National Election Studies (NES) to examine the nature of exclusion bias in public opinion concerning social welfare policy issues. 5 The NES data is well suited to my purposes because it is designed to represent the entire voting-age American public. Any conclusions regarding the presence of exclusion bias may be extended to the "mass public" writ broadly.
I will examine possible bias in three questions that gauge opinion concerning the proper level of social redistribution of economic resources-the Guaranteed Jobs, Services, and Redistribution scales. 6 The Guaran-teed Jobs scale asks respondents to place themselves on a seven-point scale measuring whether the government should "see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living." The Services scale asks if the government should "provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending." Finally, the Redistribution scale asks whether the government should "reduce income differences between the rich and the poor." 7 Together these scales tap three separate but interrelated facets of the welfare state. For the purposes of the analyses below, I have rescaled these seven-point scales to make "1" the most conservative response and "7" the most liberal response.
The American public, on the whole, took a moderate to slightly conservative view on social welfare policy questions in the mid-1990s. In 1996, the average respondent placement on the Guaranteed Jobs scale was 3.54, on the Redistribution scale was 3.72, and on the Services scale was 3.89. But at the same time, a significant portion of the population abstained from the NES social welfare policy items. 8 Specifically, nine percent of respondents claimed that they could not place themselves on the Guaranteed Jobs scale, 14 percent did not take a position on the Services scale, and 23 percent-almost one-quarter of the sample-said they did not know where they stood on the issue of income redistribution.
If my hypothesis concerning the presence of exclusion effects in social welfare opinion is correct, the picture of moderation evident in the NES surveys may present a misleading view of the underlying preferences of the American public. Specifically, if supporters of broader government involvement in economic affairs gravitate to the "no answer" response at disproportionate rates-as previous work suggests they might-it could be that the process of collecting opinion on social welfare policy through opinion surveys obscures a base of underlying liberal sentiment on those issues.
Model Construction
To explore the roots of such exclusion bias, it is necessary to examine the link between item response and opinion position. Specifically, we need to take a close look at the "ingredients" of individual opinion and see how the factors that determine the direction of response are related to the factors that determine whether the respondents will form an opinion. Insofar as these two sets of factors are closely related, the potential for exclusion bias is great.
To this end, I constructed separate models of opinionation (whether the respondent was able to form an opinion on the social welfare policy item) and opinion direction (where they placed themselves on the seven-point scale for each of the NES surveys). At one level, this effort could be viewed as a descriptive enterprise. If the same factors increase an individual's propensity to take a liberal position and decrease their tendency to answer the question, an exclusion bias will develop, regardless of the roots of the commonalties in the opinion ingredients. But, as discussed above, the search for such common factors is not a blind one. Previous work suggests that the roots of exclusion bias may lie both in the values that individuals hold, and in the types of personal resources they bring to the survey setting that enable them to link their personal concerns to the world of politics.
I therefore modeled both the decision to offer an opinion and the direction of opinion as a function of the values held by the respondents and their level of politically relevant resources. First, I included measures of support for equality and limited government, which correspond roughly to McClosky and Zaller's (1984) democracy and capitalist values, respectively. I also included a measure of the amount of conflict between these values on the idea that liberals would experience greater value conflict than conservatives. 9 To capture resources, I included measures of a respondent's education, income, and employment status. 10 tribution scales; .475 between the Redistribution and Guaranteed jobs scales). Moreover, the items have common background correlates, thereby providing additional evidence that the questions tap the same underlying dimension (see below). These results are consistent with Feldman and Zaller's (1992) analysis of these questions in the 1987 NES. Also, in recent work Jacoby (2000) finds that the Services scale taps general social welfare policy preferences. 7 The full question wording of these items is presented in the appendix. 8 Here, I include respondents who "haven't thought much" about a particular question in the "don't know" category. These respondents are accepting the interviewer's invitation to pass on a particular question and, in effect, are saying they "don't know" where they stand on that question. I do not, however, include the "not ascertained" responses in "don't know" category because it is not clear how these responses were generated. Sometimes, for example, the interviewer simply forgets to ask a particular question. The term "don't know" as used in this paper can therefore be thought of as "question abstainer." 9 The conflict measure is given as one minus the absolute value of the difference in placement on the scales (for a similar strategy, see Alvarez and Brehm 1997) . 10 The analyses here presume that attitudes towards social welfare policies can be well predicted from these variables. Some readers may wonder whether this notion is consistent with the attitude construction view advanced in this article. I argue it is because these variables presumably influence which concerns are chronically assessable with regard to social welfare policy. I thank an anonymous reviewer for noting this concern.
One issue remains, however. Simply modeling the decision to answer a question and the particular placement on a question independently is not always a wise strategy. We must also attend to issues of selection bias. Selection bias arises in cases where the relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable-the coefficients-differ for the sample of questionanswerers and the full sample. 11 Previous work has demonstrated that accounting for item nonresponse on questions measuring support for policies designed to ensure racial equality greatly alters our understanding of the structure of opinion on those policies (see Berinsky 1999) . While there is no reason to think that individuals would self-censor their views on social welfare policy at the opinion expression stage, it is important to ensure that the social welfare policy data is not contaminated by selection bias that could arise from other factors relating to nonresponse. Selection bias, after all, will arise in any situation where the sample of observed cases differs in systematic ways from the sample of unobserved cases, regardless of the roots of those differences. I therefore used a Heckman selection bias model (see Greene 1997) and estimate: (1) the determinants of item response, (2) the determinants of expressed issue position, and (3) the link between unmeasured factors affecting the two processes. 12 The model results are presented in Table 1 . Table 1 presents the parameter estimates of the models estimated using the 1996 NES data. 13 Turning first to the question of selection bias, the results here are, as expected, very different from those found in the realm of racial policies (Berinsky 1999) . The outcome equations are clearly not contaminated by selection bias. As the Table demonstrates, ρ is effectively zero in all three models. 14 In each case, the parameter estimate of ρ is less than 0.10, and the standard error exceeds the estimate of ρ by a significant margin. Thus, as expected, but unlike the case of racial opinion (Berinsky 1999) , the selection and outcome equations capture the relevant differences between respondents and non-respondents. 15 We can therefore proceed to examining the direct links between the measured variables in the two processes-the opinion ingredients identified above.
Social Welfare Policy: The Roots of Exclusion Effects
The results presented in Table 1 indicate that, as expected, the ability to form an opinion and the direction of that opinion are closely linked through the independent variables included in both models. First, the larger political culture plays a strong role in determining which types of opinions are heard in the realm of social welfare policy, and which fall by the wayside. Those individuals who subscribe to values that lead them to the conservative end of the seven-point scales-those respondents who believe strongly in limited government-are more likely to answer the social welfare policy questions than those individuals who support a larger role for government. Though the coefficient on the limited government measure is not always statistically significant, it is in all cases substantively significant and in the expected direction. However, while those individuals who support the democratic values of equality are more likely to take a liberal position on the social welfare policy scales, unlike those respondents who subscribe to capitalism, they are no more likely to offer an opinion on the social welfare policy question. Finally, as the work of Feldman and Zaller suggests, those individuals who experience value conflict are less likely to answer the social welfare policy questions, but tend to the liberal end of the seven-point scales. This effect is not, however, consistent across the three questions. 16 11 The exclusion bias I refer to in this article arises in cases where the sample of question-answerers and the sample of question-abstainers differ on the values of key independent variables 12 In order to identify the Heckman model I included a measure of the number of calls it took to contact the respondents (Brehm 1993) , on the assumption that those who are difficult to reach would also be reluctant to answer specific survey questions, but would not differ in their opinions concerning social welfare policy, independent of the other factors controlled in the equation. Similarly, I included a measure of the interviewer's experience because more experienced interviewers might be better at securing responses to individual questions. In addition, I included a measure of how often the respondent discussed politics with their friends and neighbors in the last week and their levels of political information. 13 These results are robust to respecification including other demographic controls such as age, race, and gender.
14 As expected, the introduction of the Heckman selection bias correction does not alter the model estimates. The outcome equation estimates are nearly identical when that equation is estimated independent of the selection equation. None of the coefficients move more than a few percentage points once the correction is introduced. The effects of the larger political culture are, as predicted, exacerbated by the existence of resource differentials between the natural supporters and opponents of social welfare policies. By and large, those individuals who possess personal characteristics that would incline them toward the liberal positions on the seven-point scales-the unemployed, those with low incomes, and those who possess low levels of education-are less likely to offer opinions on the social welfare policy questions. Though the coefficients on those variables do not always reach statistical significance, the coefficients have the anticipated sign in both the choice and item response equations for all the models. This trend holds for all three questions, but is strongest for the Redistribution item It appears, then, the same factors in part drive both the decision to give an opinion on the social welfare policy questions and the direction of that opinion. As expected, certain types of opinion ingredients both drive individuals towards the conservative end of the policy spectrum and enable them to answer the social welfare policy questions. Those individuals who avoid the fault line in the larger political culture between capitalism and democracy-those individuals who subscribe only to the capitalist principle of limited government-are more likely to voice opinions, and opinions with a conservative bent. Furthermore, those individuals advantaged in the resources that allow one to relate one's personal concerns to the larger political stage and form coherent summary judgments on survey questions are also more likely to express opposition to the welfare state. Thus, there is reason to believe that the (fairly substantial) population of respondents who abstain from the issue placement questions because of high levels of uncertainty and ambivalence differ from the population of respondents in their political preferences concerning social welfare policy. Given this state of affairs, to fairly represent public sentiment on issues of social welfare policy, we need to somehow correct for the opinion distortions that lead to exclusion bias.
Exclusion Bias: Estimation and Interpretation
It is possible to compute empirically the degree of exclusion bias in social welfare policy opinion. Because the bias works through the independent variables, we can use what we know about the opinions of the questionanswerers to characterize the opinions of those individuals who declined to answer the question. In effect, we can determine what the nonanswerers would have said if they were able to overcome their uncertainty and ambivalence and give voice to their politically relevant wants, needs, and desires. 17 We can then compare this constructed mean to the mean of those individuals who place themselves on the issue scales to gauge the extentnot simply the presence-of exclusion bias. It should be noted that though the predictors of item response do not always reach statistical significance in Table 1 , the placers and nonplacers differ significantly in the composition of their opinion ingredients. Put another way, at a bivariate level, all predictors of opinion holding in Table 1 are significant. Table 2 indicates that, as expected, the differences in mean opinion between scale placers and those individuals who do not answer items are significant across all the social welfare policy questions. Issue placers are almost one-half a point more conservative on the seven-point scales than our best estimate of the mean position of those who abstain from the issue placement questions in 1996. Thus, the differences between the respondents and the non-respondents on the various opinion ingredients-the resources and values that determine social welfare policy positions-have real consequences for the types of social welfare policy opinions we would expect them to hold.
Validating the Imputation
Given that I assessed the differences between scale placers and nonplacers using opinion placements constructed, in part, by imputing interests to individuals who opted out of answering survey questions, a healthy degree of skepticism is understandable. However, such skepticism is unfounded; the finding of a pro-conservative tilt among the population of issue placers extends from the imputed interests to expressed opinions.
While some respondents declined to answer all three of the social welfare policy items in 1996, other respondents who abstained from one of the items answered one or two of the other items. We therefore have a measure of social welfare policy sentiments for some respondents who declined to answer particular social welfare policy items. For example, of the 350 respon-17 Specifically, I use the coefficients presented in Table 1 to predict the issue positions of the nonrespondents. This approach is valid; there is no selection bias in the data. The β for the sample under analysis (the sample which excludes the nonscale placers) is therefore the full sample β. Thus, the relationship between the independent and dependent variables is not different for the people who answer the social welfare policy question compared to those who are unable to form coherent opinions on those issues. I also replicated these analyses using both more and less extensive models of opinion direction. In all cases, the predicted differences between placers and nonplacers remained stable. Note: The use of T-Tests to gauge the difference between the two groups is inappropriate because this table compares projected issue placements to actual issue placements. But predicted positions generated using the Clarify program (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000) indicates these differences are significant at the .01 level dents who did not answer the Redistribution question, 81 percent answered the Guaranteed Jobs item, and 68 percent placed themselves on the Services and Spending scale. The actual answers these "partial respondents" gave can be compared to the answers of the item placers to see if the differences found in Table 2 are mirrored in measured opinions. In Table 3 , I present the social welfare issue placement positions for respondents and nonrespondents in 1996. Replicating the differences found in Table 2 , those individuals who were not able to form an opinion on one of the issue placement scales were significantly more liberal than placers on those items they did answer. For example, Services scale nonplacers were almost one-half point more liberal than placers on the Guaranteed Jobs scale and were almost one full point more liberal on the Redistribution scale. 18 In sum, the analysis of both simulated and measured opinions of the NES survey respondents leads to the same conclusion. 19 Those individuals who, due to uncertainty and ambivalence surrounding the social welfare issues examined here, are unable to answer the Guaranteed Jobs, Services, and Redistribution scales are more favorable to policies that support the welfare state than those individual who are able to form opinions on the NES issue placement questions. Thus, when the mass public speaks through opinion polls, a portion of liberal sentiment on social welfare policy questions is not heard.
Aggregate Consequences
While the analyses presented above show that respondents and non-respondents differ in their social welfare policy sentiment, the effect of correcting for individuallevel opinion distortions on the aggregate shape of social welfare policy opinion remains to be estimated. If we look to the NES to determine how the nation as a whole views social welfare policies by measuring the mean position given by the scale placers, we will arrive at a biased picture of the national sentiment. The true mean, after all, depends not only on the mean for question-answerers but also on the mean for question abstainers. The degree of bias in the estimate of the sample mean depends both on the proportion of question abstainers in the sample and the difference between the mean of the answerers and the mean of the abstainers. With measures of these quantities, then, we can estimate the degree of exclusion bias in aggregate social welfare policy opinion. All of this information is readily available. 20 18 This difference between placers and nonplacers extends not only across different social welfare policy items asked in the same survey, but also to the same items asked at different points in time.
The 1996 NES data examined above was the last wave of a threewave panel survey conducted in 1992, 1994, and 1996 . We therefore have measures in 1992 and 1994 of the social welfare policy opinions for some individuals who in 1996 said that they did not know where they stood on the Services and Guaranteed Jobs scales. For instance, we have measures of self-placement on the Services scale in 1992 and/or 1994 for 74 percent of those respondents who declined to answer the item in 1996. We can use this data to validate further the differences in the difference between respondents and nonrespondents found above. Such analysis indicates that the pattern of liberal social welfare policy sentiment among the "don't know" respondents uncovered in Tables 2 and 3 continues. Individuals who did not answer the social welfare policy items in 1996 gave, on average in 1992 and 1994, answers that were about one-third point more liberal than those respondents who took a position in 1996. 19 Additional analyses confirm that the differences between placers and nonplacers are driven by differences in social welfare policy sentiment, rather than general liberalism. Nonplacers are significantly more liberal than placers on the NES item that taps beliefs about spending on the "poor." However, the two groups are identical in their beliefs regarding spending on "Blacks" and "crime."
20 I estimate the respondent mean and the nonresponse rate for each of the three social welfare policy issue scales using data from the NES, and I use the estimates of the mean position of the nonplacers generated from the coefficient estimates in Table 1 . I use for comparison the predicted values generated by the regression estimates, rather than the actual response frequency distributions, because by using predicted values generated by a model, I hold constant the predictive power of that model across the estimates.
The estimates of the aggregate bias are presented in Table 4 . The bias is calculated in units of the seven-point NES issue scales. As expected, the estimates indicate that the sample mean overestimates the American public's conservatism on social welfare policy issues. The direction of this bias is consistent across issues and across years. However, the degree of this bias is rather small, ranging from the equivalent of one-half to two points on a 100-point scale. Nonrespondents therefore differ significantly from respondents in their social welfare policy preferences, but in the aggregate, this difference does not significantly change our measures of collective opinion.
These results may initially seem reassuring. But they are less reassuring if we pull our frame of analysis back to a lower level of aggregation. Take, for example, opinion at the level of Census region. The level of exclusion of bias on the redistribution in the South is 0.17, a figure that is almost three times the comparable bias in the Northeast. 21 Furthermore, regardless of the level of analysis we choose, we should not lose sight of the central point underscored by this article. The fact remains that those who keep silent on social welfare policy issues would-if they gave opinions-speak in a different manner than those who are able to bring their politically relevant wants, needs, and desires to bear on social welfare policy controversies. Put another way, the "voice" of those who abstain from the social welfare policy questions is different from those who respond to such items.
This result is especially important because it echoes the patterns of inequality found in traditional forms of political participation. As Table 5 demonstrates, the differences found between placers and non-placers on the social welfare policy items mirrors the differences between participators and nonparticipators in both direction and size. Nonvoters are about one-half point more liberal on all the social welfare policy questions than are voters. Those who fail to participate in campaigns are one-third of a point more liberal than campaign activists. In short, in polls, as in other avenues of public expression, it is the voice of the disadvantaged that is muted (though for a contrary finding using data collected in an earlier era, see Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980) .
Conclusion
The results presented here deepen our understanding of biases in opinion polls in particular, and political participation more generally. As hypothesized, those respondents who are able to form opinions on social welfare policy issues are more conservative than those respondents who are not able to come to such coherent judgments. The natural supporters of the welfare state are, therefore, more likely to abstain from polling questions on the welfare state. Thus, the larger political culture surrounding social welfare policy questions in combination Moving to a more explicitly political context, consider opinion at the level of the State. If Senators from some states receive signals more reflective of the underlying social welfare policy sentiment of their constituents than others, the clarity of the "voice" of the mass public will vary greatly across states, even if such differences largely wash out at the aggregate level. The NES data reveal that a wide range of exclusion bias may exist at this level. For example, there is no exclusion bias on the redistribution question in New Jersey. In Arkansas, on the other hand, opinion on redistribution understates liberal sentiment by almost one-half a point on the sevenpoint NES. Given the relatively small sample sizes at the State level and the NES sampling procedures, it would be an error to take this evidence as anything more than suggestive. But these crosssectional differences indicate that the existence of exclusion bias in aggregate public opinion is not necessarily innocuous. Note: A participator is a person who said they engaged in at least one of the four following activities: (1) trying to convince other people they should vote for one of the parties or candidates; (2) attending political meeting; (3) doing work for one of the parties or candidates; and (4) wearing a button supporting one of the parties or candidates. * = p < .10; ** = p < .05 with significant resource differentials that fall along, not across, this political fault line understates support for an expanded social welfare state. When aggregated at the national level, as demonstrated above, this bias does not appear to threaten significantly the representativeness of public opinion signals. The collective national signals concerning social welfare policy opinion carried through opinion polls are surely distorted, but may not be distorted enough to make a difference for how we view public sentiment on these issues. This could be taken as a reassuring result.
But there are several reasons to think that these results just scratch the surface of the problem. As the regional analyses suggest, if we move the frame of analysis to a subnational level of aggregation, exclusion bias can lead to significantly distorted measures of opinion. Furthermore, the analyses here do not account for possible distortions in the opinions that respondents actually express. It is likely that the same ambivalence and uncertainty that leads to item nonresponse would also lead to an increased level of "noise" in their opinions. In this case, the level of exclusion bias may be understated. Here, then, we have only an estimate of the "floor" of the problem-the best we can hope for. Further work must be done to determine how high the ceiling could go.
But even if the floor turns out to be the ceiling, the results presented here are problematic. Those who keep silent on social welfare policy issues would, if they gave opinions, speak in a different manner than those who are able to bring their politically relevant wants, needs, and desires to bear on social welfare policy controversies. This bias found here mirrors the patterns of inequality found in traditional forms of political participation, such as voting and contributing time and money to political campaigns (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) . Opinion polls, contrary to the claims of Gallup and Verba, do not make up for the inegalitarian shortcomings of many forms of participation. Under some circumstances, they echo and may even reinforce those shortcomings. December 22, 2000 . Final manuscript received June 5, 2001 
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